I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University. I have wide-ranging interests in epistemology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and metaphilosophy. So far, most of my research has focused on debates about the epistemic norms that govern philosophical inquiry. I am currently developing elements from previous work to investigate the epistemology of democracy.
The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy - The Philosophical Quarterly, Forthcoming
Can We Talk It Out? - Episteme, Forthcoming
Philosophical Dimensions of the Trial (co-edited with Lisa Bastian and Lewis Ross) - American Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
The Problem of Intuitive Presence - Philosophers' Imprint, 2022
Why Understanding-why is Contrastive - Synthese, 2021
Who's Afraid of Cognitive Diversity? - Inquiry, 2021
No hope for the Irrelevance Claim - Philosophical Studies, 2020
Testing for the Phenomenal: Intuition, Metacognition, and Philosophical Methodology - Mind & Language, 2020
Title Redacted (Under review)
What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first explain that dominant phenomenalist views of intuition---which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology---cannot capture this distinction. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence. Lastly, I argue that an enactivist view of intuition, which emphasises the role of mental actions in producing intuitions, merits further attention as it both satisfies the proposed desideratum and offers a clear and plausible account of the nature of skilful intuition.
Suspension on political suspension (In progress)
What should we do upon learning we disagree with others on political topics? I argue that answering this question gives rise to a problem. Views in the epistemology of disagreement suggest we should sometimes suspend our political beliefs in face of such disputes. However, research on the source of political disagreements and normative theories of democracy reveals that requiring people to suspend on political matters proves corrosive for democracy. I solve this problem by proposing that political commitments should take the form of what some have called 'endorsements'.