I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University. I have wide-ranging interests in epistemology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and metaphilosophy. So far, most of my research has focused on debates about the epistemic norms that govern philosophical inquiry. I am currently developing elements from previous work to investigate the epistemology of democracy.

A well-known objection to epistemic arguments for democracy says that if democratic methods are truth-tracking, then people holding the minority view should defer to those of the majority. However, it seems wrong to require that people surrender their political judgements in this way. I argue that even if epistemic democrats can respond to this 'deference problem', a closer look at the motivations of this problem reveals an even more serious issue for epistemic arguments for democracy. I call this the 'suspension problem'.

What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first explain that dominant phenomenalist views of intuition---which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology---cannot capture this distinction. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence. Lastly, I argue that an enactivist view of intuition, which emphasises the role of mental actions in producing intuitions, merits further attention as it both satisfies the proposed desideratum and offers a clear and plausible account of the nature of skilful intuition.

I argue that research on metacognition informs philosophical debates about the nature of inferential reasoning. In particular, I show how experimental and theoretical developments in meta-reasoning help to articulate and defend the Taking Condition -- i.e., the idea that inferential reasoning requires a rational appreciation of the relation of epistemic support holding between premises and conclusions.